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Abstract
One leading approach to justification comes from the reliabilist tradition, which
maintains that a belief is justified provided that it is reliably formed. Another
comes from the ‘Reasons First’ tradition, which claims that a belief is justified
provided that it is based on reasons that support it. These two approaches
are typically developed in isolation from each other; this essay motivates and
defends a synthesis. On the view proposed here, justification is understood in
terms of an agent’s reasons for belief, which are in turn analyzed along reliabilist
lines: an agent’s reasons for belief are the states that serve as inputs to their
reliable processes. I show that this synthesis allows each tradition to profit from
the other’s explanatory resources. In particular, it enables reliabilists to explain
epistemic defeat without abandoning their naturalistic ambitions. I go on to
compare my proposed synthesis with other hybrid versions of reliabilism that
have been proposed in the literature.
1 Two approaches to justification
What determines whether a belief is justified?
One answer comes from the reliabilist tradition:
Reliabilist Answer Whether a belief is justified depends on whether it is reliably
formed.1
Reliabilism holds considerable appeal. First, it captures the intuition that there
is an important connection between justification and truth: a reliable process is
standardly defined as a process that produces a high ratio of true to false beliefs.
Second, it explains how justification reduces to non-epistemic properties. Justification
is explained in terms of reliability, which is explained in terms of truth and falsity.
1The locus classicus of reliabilism about justification is Goldman (1979). For further development
and defense, see Goldman (1986, 2012); Kornblith (2002); Lyons (2009).
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Reliabilism thus offers a way of locating epistemic properties within a naturalistic
worldview.2
Despite its appeal, reliabilism faces significant challenges. Many of these are
by now well-known, and have elicited replies from reliabilists, which in turn have
elicited counter-replies.3 In this paper, I will bypass this well-worn terrain to focus
on a challenge that has received comparatively little attention—one that attacks the
heart of reliabilism’s reductive aspirations.
The challenge arises from the fact that a belief can be reliably formed even though
the believer has good reason to think the belief is false, or that it was unreliably
formed. When this happens, the belief is defeated. In order to account for such cases,
reliabilists need to provide a theory of defeat. And in order for this account to be
faithful to reliabilism’s reductive ambitions, it had better not use any epistemic terms
in the analysans.
Providing such an account is no easy task. The standard reliabilist approach
is to say that a belief is defeated when there is an alternative reliable process that
would have led the believer to abandon the belief, had it been used. But, as we’ll see
shortly, this approach faces serious problems. This raises the worry that reliabilists
are unable to explain a central facet of justification.
Faced with this difficulty, it is tempting to look beyond the reliabilist tradition
for help. Another prominent account of justification comes from the ‘Reasons First’
tradition. This tradition offers a different answer to our starting question:
Reasons First Answer Whether a belief is justified depends on whether it is sup-
ported by adequate reasons.
An advantage of the Reasons First framework is that it provides a promising
account of defeat. A belief is prima facie justified if it is supported by the agent’s prima
facie reasons. Defeat occurs when this support is undermined by the acquisition of
further reasons. This approach to defeat has been elaborated in great detail by John
Pollock, who develops a rigorous system for computing the defeat statuses of an
agent’s beliefs on the basis of their prima facie reasons.4
Despite these advantages, the Reasons First framework faces difficulties of its
own. As standardly developed, the Reasons First framework lacks the explanatory
benefits that make reliabilism attractive. It leaves unexplained the intuitive connection
between justification and truth, and it does not reduce epistemic properties to non-
epistemic properties. After all, Reasons Firsters take the notion of a reason to believe
as a primitive. But this is clearly an epistemic notion.
2The reductive goals of reliabilism are clearly announced by Goldman, who writes: “I want a theory
of justified belief to specify in non-epistemic terms when a belief is justified” (1979: 90). As Kim (1988)
notes, one motivation for seeking a reductive account is that epistemic properties supervene on natural
properties. A reductive account offers to explain this supervenience.
3For an overview of the major challenges and replies, see Goldman and Beddor (2015).
4See Pollock (1987, 1992, 1994, 1995, 2001). For a useful overview of the development of Pollock’s
framework, see Prakken and Horty (2012).
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Given this tradeoff, we might hope for a theory that combines the attractions of
both traditions. This paper develops one such theory: “Reasons Reliabilism.” The
theory follows the Reasons First tradition in explaining defeat in terms of the notion
of a reason to believe, which is taken to be the most fundamental normative notion. But
unlike most Reasons First views, my theory does not leave this notion unanalyzed.
Rather, it goes on to explain this notion in reliabilist terms. Simplifying slightly, I
identify an agent’s reasons for belief with the states that serve as potential inputs
to their reliable processes. What emerges is a more reasonable form of reliabilism,
one that preserves the best of both traditions. In particular, it provides an elegant
treatment of defeat while remaining faithful to reliabilism’s reductive project.
Of course, I am not the first to advocate an ‘impure’ or ‘hybrid’ version of
reliabilism. In recent years a number of other authors have proposed synthesizing of
reliabilism and evidentialism.5 However, I argue that extant evidentialist-reliabilist
hybrids lack one of the chief advantages of the view advocated here: namely, its
ability to explain defeat. Much like the ‘pure’ Reasons First framework, extant
hybrids struggle to provide a theory that is both reductive and predictive. They also
problematically single out a privileged class of beliefs—those entailed by the agent’s
evidence—as immune to defeat. The synthesis developed here fares better on both
counts.
2 The classic reliabilist account of defeat
2.1 Why reliabilists need an account of defeat
In order to introduce reliabilism’s difficulties with defeat, it will be helpful to start
with a simple version of reliabilism:
Simple Reliabilism An agent’s belief is justified iff it is formed by a reliable belief-
forming process.
Next, consider a stock example of defeat:
Seeing Red Lori is gazing at a wall, which appears red. Consequently, she comes to
believe red: The wall is red. Just then, a generally reliable acquaintance, Sal,
mentions to Lori that there are hidden red lights angled towards the wall.6
According to Simple Reliabilism, Lori’s belief in red remains justified even after
she receives Sal’s testimony. After all, her belief is formed via vision, and we can
5See Alston (1988); Henderson et al. (2007); Comesaña (2010, 2018); Goldman (2011); Tang (2016);
Pettigrew (2018); Miller (2019). Most of these syntheses have been motivated by considerations other
than defeat, though Miller (2019) is an important exception.
6For discussion of this sort of case, see a.o., Chisholm (1966); Pollock (1995); Lasonen-Aarnio (2010a).
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stipulate that she has excellent eyesight. But, intuitively, Sal’s testimony defeats
Lori’s justification for believing red.7
In view of such cases, most reliabilists conclude that Simple Reliabilism is at best
an adequate account of prima facie justification. In order for a belief to be ultima facie
justified (that is, justified full-stop) it is not enough for it to be reliably formed. It also
needs to satisfy a ‘No Defeaters’ condition.8
However, introducing a ‘No Defeaters’ condition raises a difficult question. Defeat
is clearly an epistemic notion. In order to fulfill their reductive ambitions, reliabilists
need to explain this notion in non-epistemic terms. Can this be done?
2.2 The alternative reliable process account of defeat
Reliabilists have not left this question unanswered. The standard reliabilist strategy
is to explain defeat in terms of counterfactuals about what the agent would have
believed, were they to have used some alternative reliable process.9 More precisely:
Alternative Reliable Process Account (ARP) An agent A’s belief B is defeated iff
there is some alternative reliable (or conditionally reliable) process available to
A which, if it had been used in addition to the process actually used, would
have resulted in A’s not holding B.
At first blush, ARP looks promising. It appears to explain defeat in entirely
naturalistic terms. It also seems to deliver the right verdicts in many cases. Take
Seeing Red: since Sal is stipulated to be generally reliable, deferring to Sal’s testimony
is a reliable process. And if Lori had used this process in addition to vision, she
wouldn’t have continued to believe red.
These advantages nothwithstanding, ARP faces three serious challenges.
7Perhaps, some may suggest, once Lori receives Sal’s testimony, her belief in red is no longer
the result of vision alone. Rather, it’s the result of a complex process: using vision while disregarding
testimony that vision is locally unreliable. Arguably, this complex process is unreliable. However, I think
there is reason to be skeptical of this ‘typing maneuver.’ In order for it to handle all cases of defeat, we
would need to take on board a substantive commitment: In every case of defeat, there is some way w of
typing the agent’s belief-forming process on which it comes out unreliable. And in order to ensure that this
approach is not ad hoc, we’d need to give some independent motivation for typing the belief-forming
process using w. For further development of this concern, see Beddor (2015a): 147-148, where I argue
that this typing maneuver stands in tension with promising solutions to the generality problem. For
related criticisms of the typing maneuver, see Lasonen-Aarnio (2010a): 4-7; Baker-Hytch and Benton
(2015): 45-47.
8Adding a ‘No Defeaters’ condition may also help the reliabilist deal with other challenges. Take
Bonjour’s (1985) famous example of Norman the clairvoyant. Norman has a reliable clairvoyant faculty,
but has no reason to suspect that he does. One day his clairvoyance causes him to believe that the
president is in New York. Bonjour contends that Norman’s belief is not justified, even though it is
reliably formed. As Goldman notes (1986: 112), one strategy for handling this case is to maintain that
Norman’s belief is prima facie justified but defeated.
9This proposal dates back to Goldman (1979), and has been recently defended by Lyons (2009, 2016).
Close cousins are defended in Grundmann (2009) and Bedke (2010).
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3 Difficulties for the classic reliabilist account
3.1 Defeater defeaters
An initial difficulty for ARP—noted in passing by Lyons (2009): 124—is that it yields
the wrong results when defeaters are themselves defeated. An example:
Two Testimony Seeing Red As before, Lori believes the wall is red, based on its
appearance. And as before, Sal comes along and mentions that the wall is
illuminated by red lights. But now another reliable acquaintance, Anne, comes
along and provides compelling—though ultimately misleading—testimony
that Sal is a compulsive liar.
According to ARP, Lori’s belief in red is defeated, even after receiving the
evidence of Sal’s mendacity. After all, Anne’s testimony is misleading, and so
trusting Sal’s testimony continues to be a reliable process. And this process remains
available to Lori. (Lori could, after all, simply disregard Anne’s testimony.) But this
is the wrong verdict. Intuitively, Anne’s testimony defeats the defeater provided by
Sal’s testimony. In doing so, it reinstates Lori’s justification for believing red.
3.2 Hidden circularity
A second concern for ARP was raised by Fumerton (1988), but has not received
much attention in the subsequent literature. The worry is that ARP, when properly
unpacked, smuggles the notion of ultima facie justification into the analysis of defeat.
As a result, the reliabilist account of justification fails to be reductive; worse still, it is
circular. Fleshing out this worry requires some stage-setting.
Many reliabilists opt for a theory that distinguishes between inferential and
non-inferential beliefs. To motivate this complication, consider an inferential process
such as deducing the consequences of what one already believes. This process is not
reliable or unreliable simpliciter; it is only conditionally reliable.
In order to handle beliefs formed through conditionally reliable processes, Gold-
man (1979) officially formulates reliabilism as a recursive theory:
Recursive Reliablism
Base Clause If (i) A’s belief B results from a belief-independent process that
is unconditionally reliable, and (ii) B is undefeated, then B is ultima facie
justified.
Recursive Clause If (i) A’s belief B results from a belief-dependent process
that is conditionally reliable, (ii) the inputs to this process were ultima facie
justified, and (iii) B is undefeated, then B is ultima facie justified.10
10See also Lyons (2013), who argues that distinguishing between inferential and non-inferential
beliefs can help reliabilists handle the new evil demon problem (Cohen 1984).
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The recursive clause requires that the conditionally reliable processes operate on
ultima facie justified beliefs. Despite this, the theory is still reductive. After all, we can
use the theory to explain what it is for these input beliefs to be ultima facie justified.
Either these inputs are themselves inferential or they are not. If they are, we appeal
once again to the recursive clause; if not, we appeal to the base clause. Either way,
we eventually arrive at some foundational beliefs whose justificatory status can be
explained using the base clause. Now, the only epistemic notion that appears in the
base clause is the notion of being undefeated. Assuming ARP provides a reductive
account of this notion, Recursive Reliabilism is reductive.
Where, then, lies the problem? Fumerton observes that, according to ARP,
conditionally reliable processes sometimes function as defeaters: a belief is defeated
if there is some conditionally reliable process available to the agent which, had it
been used, would have resulted in the agent no longer holding the belief. But a
conditionally reliable process cannot lead someone to abandon a belief all on its own;
it can only do so if it is fed certain inputs. This raises the question: what epistemic
status do these input beliefs need to have? Fumerton suggests that just as Recursive
Reliabilism required that the inputs be ultima facie justified, so too should ARP. And
so ARP really amounts to the following:
ARP Unpacked A’s belief B is defeated iff either:
1. There is some reliable belief-independent process that A could have used,
which would have resulted in A not holding B, or
2. There is some conditionally reliable belief-dependent process that A could
have used to process ultima facie justified inputs, which would have re-
sulted in A not holding B.
But if this is the proper way of understanding ARP, then reliabilism’s reductive
project is in trouble. After all, Recursive Reliabilism qualified as reductive because
the base clause purported to tell us what it takes for a foundational belief to be ultima
facie justified without using any epistemic terms in the analysans. But if we use ARP
Unpacked to explain what it is for a belief to be undefeated, the base clause will
itself rely on the notion of ultima facie justification.
Perhaps, some may reply, this just shows we should reject the assumption that
the inputs to a conditionally reliable process need to be ultima facie justified. Perhaps
the input beliefs need only be prima facie justified; or perhaps they do not even need
this slender epistemic merit.11 However, this reply incurs some counterintuitive
commitments. Imagine a variant of Seeing Red where Lori unjustifiably believes that
the wall is illuminated by red lights, but continues to believe red anyway. Clearly,
her overall set of beliefs is epistemically defective. But does this defect render her
belief in red unjustified? To answer this, it will help to consider a slightly different
question: Should Lori abandon her belief in red? I think not. After all, she has no
11A number of authors have defended the idea that unjustified beliefs can function as defeaters, e.g.
Lackey (1999); Bergmann (2006). Goldman himself flirts with this view in places (1986: 62, 111).
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good reason to abandon it. Instead, it’s her belief about the lighting that should get
the boot. But if Lori should retain her belief in red, it becomes hard to maintain that
this belief is defeated. (If it is defeated, then she should abandon it!) This intuition
motivates the idea that only ultima facie justified inputs can serve as defeaters. But if
we hang on to this idea, the circularity problem remains.12
3.3 Alternative processes that one should not use
According to ARP, an agent’s belief is defeated whenever they have an available
reliable process that meets a certain counterfactual condition—namely, that if they
were to use it, they would abandon their belief. But it seems that an agent can
have an available reliable process that meets this condition without having any good
reason to use it. When this happens, the mere availability of the process does not
seem to defeat the belief.
Here’s a case I offered in an earlier paper (Beddor 2015a: 149-150) that illustrates
this point:
Thinking About Unger Harry sees a tree in front of him; he consequently believes
tree: There is a tree in front of me. Now, Harry happens to be very good
at forming beliefs about what Peter Unger’s skeptical 1975 time-slice would
advise him to believe in any situation. Call this process his ‘Unger Predictor’:
in any situation, Harry’s Unger Predictor spits out an accurate belief about
what doxastic attitudes Unger’s 1975 time-slice would advise an agent to adopt
in that situation. Moreover, Harry has a high opinion of Unger’s 1975 time-slice.
Were he to realize that Unger would advise him to suspend judgment on some
proposition, this would lead him to suspend judgment on that claim. So if
Harry had used his Unger Predictor, he would have come to believe suspend:
Unger would advise me (Harry) to suspend judgment regarding tree. This would,
in turn, have caused Harry to suspend judgment regarding tree.
According to ARP, Harry’s belief in tree is defeated. After all, there is a reliable
process available to him (his Unger Predictor) that would have resulted in him no
longer believing tree, had it been used. But this seems wrong. Harry is not, as a
matter of fact, using his Unger Predictor; perhaps he hasn’t used it in many years.
As it stands, he has an excellent reason to believe tree (the testimony of his senses).
The mere availability of his Unger Predictor does not seem undermine this reason.
Defenders of ARP may suggest there’s an easy fix. A natural reaction to Thinking
About Unger is that the example exploits a subject matter mismatch. Harry’s belief is
about trees. The Unger Predictor does not produce doxastic attitudes about trees,
12One way out of this problem would be to reinterpret ARP as providing a theory of prima facie
defeat rather than ultima facie defeat. So in our variant of Seeing Red, Lori’s belief is red is prima
facie defeated, but this defeater is itself defeated by whatever considerations make her belief about the
lighting conditions unjustified. But this response is unavailable to proponents of ARP, since—as we’ve
seen—ARP lacks the resources to handle defeater defeat.
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but only about Unger’s advice. This suggests a simple patch to ARP: simply require
that in order for an alternative process to defeat an agent’s belief in p, that process
must produce beliefs about p-related matters.
However, it is doubtful whether this simple fix suffices. Suppose Harry had used
his Unger Predictor. Then some process would have led him to suspend judgment
on tree. It’s just that this would have been a two-stage process. This first stage
would have been his Unger Predictor; the second stage would have been a process
that implements Unger’s predicted advice. Call this two-stage process his ‘Unger
Emulator’. Now, this Unger Emulator produces doxastic attitudes towards all sorts
of subjects, including the presence of trees. Assuming that this process is reliable,
then ARP—even once amended—still delivers the wrong result.
Some might question whether this Unger Emulator process is really reliable. Sure,
it avoids all errors, but only at the cost of avoiding all truths! Perhaps this is too
high a cost; perhaps the right conception of reliability will classify this process as
unreliable.13 But even if we concede the point, we can simply tweak the example
(Beddor 2015a: 153-154). Meet Shmunger, whose skepticism is much more modest.
Shmunger has lots of true beliefs about all sorts of subjects; she is only a skeptic
when it comes to trees. We can then run the case using Shmunger instead of Unger.
Simply stipulate that Harry has an extremely reliable Shmunger Predictor, which
is part of a Schmunger Emulator: were Harry to reflect on what Shmunger would
advise, he would come to believe Schmunger would advise me to suspend judgment
on whether there is a tree in front of me, which would in turn cause him to suspend
judgment on tree. Note that here proponents of ARP cannot plead that Harry’s
Schmunger Emulator is unreliable. After all, it systematically produces true beliefs
on a wide array of subjects; it only leads to suspension of judgment on arboreal
matters.14
13The formal epistemology literature offers a natural place to look for a measure of reliability along
these lines. See the discussions of credal scoring rules in Joyce (1998); Moss (2011); Pettigrew (2016),
among many others.
14In my earlier paper, I also offered a counterexample to the necessity of ARP for defeat. In the
proposed counterexample, Clarence reliably forms a belief that p; a reliable interlocutor later tells him¬p. But Clarence irrationally disbelieves everything this interlocutor says. Moreover, no amount of
reflection or counseling would ever uproot this deep-seated mistrust. Intuitively, Clarence’s belief is
defeated. But ARP seem unable to deliver this result: there is no process available to Clarence which
would lead him to trust his interlocutor; hence there is no process available to him which, if used,
would lead him to abandon his belief in p. (Cf. Baker-Hytch and Benton 2015: 53.)
However, in this case—unlike Thinking About Unger—it now seems to me that a modification of
ARP will suffice. The key is to reformulate ARP in terms of dispositions rather than counterfactuals:
A’s belief that p is defeated iff there is some alternative reliable process available to A which, when
fed A’s current states as input, is disposed to lead A to cease believing p. Defenders of ARP could then
propose that Clarence has a general testimony-believer process available to him. This is a process that,
for any testifier (or, perhaps, any testifier that he has no good reason to distrust), produces a relatively
high credence in their testimony. This process is generally reliable. Moreover, it is disposed to lead
Clarence to cease believing p, when fed the experience of receiving his interlocutor’s testimony as
input. It’s just that this disposition is masked by Clarence’s mistrust of his interlocutor.
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3.4 Looking forward
Taken together, these problems show that ARP will not do. But it would be premature
for reliabilists to admit defeat. The rest of this paper develops a more promising
approach, which draws on the resources of the Reasons First tradition.
Here is the plan for what follows. I start (§4) by outlining the most well-developed
version of the Reasons First framework to date, which is due to John Pollock. While
Pollock offers a promising formal framework for understanding the structure of
justification and defeat, I argue that it should not supplant reliabilism (§5). Rather,
we should seek a theory that combines the structural features of Pollock’s framework
with the core reliabilist strategy for reducing the epistemic to the non-epistemic. §6
develops such a theory; §7 advertises its advantages; and §8 compares it to other
hybrid views.
4 Pollock’s reasons first framework
According to the Reasons First tradition, justification is intimately connected with
reasons. This idea has considerable intuitive appeal. ‘A justified belief is supported
by reasons’ has the ring of a platitude; ‘A belief can be justified, even though all the
reasons count against it’ has the ring of a contradiction.
In addition to capturing these intuitions, the Reasons First approach offers a
promising treatment of defeat. For a belief to be prima facie justified is for it to be
based on prima facie reasons that support it. Defeat occurs when the agent acquires
reasons that either count against the belief itself, or against the support provided by
the reasons on which it is based.
This way of understanding defeat has been given a systematic development by
John Pollock in a series of papers spanning over thirty years.15 Pollock’s frame-
work has proven influential beyond epistemology, laying the groundwork for much
research in computer science and AI—an influence that attests to the explanatory
fruitfulness of its core ideas. In this section, I offer a streamlined overview of Pol-
lock’s framework. (Readers uninterested in the formal nuts-and-bolts should feel
free to skim.)
Pollock’s key piece of formal machinery is an inference graph: a labeled directed
graph providing an abstract representation of all the reasons that bear on the justifica-
tory status of an agent’s beliefs. The agent’s reasons—as well as the conclusions they
support—are represented by nodes. Support and defeat relations are represented by
directed edges. An agent need not actually perform all of the inferences encoded in
their inference graph. Rather, the inference graph represents all the inferences that
are available to them.
For illustration, Fig. 1 provides an inference graph for Seeing Red. Dashed
arrows represent support relations; solid arrows represent defeat relations. Here
Lori’s visual experience provides a prima facie reason in support of the node, red.
15See the references in fn. 4.
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And Sal’s testimony provides a prima facie reason in support of the node, The wall is
illuminated by red lights (rl). This in turn supports the node, Lori’s visual experience
doesn’t reliably indicate the truth of red (u), which defeats red.
veLori’svisual experience
α
rl wall illuminatedby red lights
st Sal’s testimony
β
u ve doesn’treliably indicate rrwall is red
Figure 1: Seeing Red
Inferential support often involves multiple steps. Pollock represents multi-step
arguments with inference branches. An inference branch is an ordered sequence of
nodes, each of which is the immediate ancestor of the next. For example, in Fig.
1 branch α is the directed path from Lori’s visual experience to red. Branch β is
the directed path originating in the experience of receiving Sal’s testimony, leading
through rl, and terminating in u.
Using these resources, we can now flesh out the animating idea behind the
Reasons First framework as follows:
Justified Belief as Undefeated Reasoning An agent’s belief is ultima facie justified
iff it is the result of an ultimately undefeated inference branch.
This formulation invites two questions. First, what does it mean for a belief to be
the result of an inference branch? For starters, the belief must be supported by the
sequence of reasons represented by the inference branch. But this is not sufficient:
the agent must actually have gone through this reasoning, and hold the belief on this
basis.
Second, what does it mean for an inference branch to be ultimately undefeated?
This question is harder, and Pollock’s answer proceeds in stages.
The first stage is to give an account of what it means for one reason to be defeated
by another. According to Pollock, there are two species of defeat: rebutting defeaters
and undercutting defeaters. A rebutting defeater for a node n is a prima facie reason to
think that n is false. By contrast, an undercutting defeater for n targets the inferential
connection between n and the reasons that support it. Seeing Red is like this: Sal’s
testimony that the wall is illuminated by red lights is not itself a reason to believe that
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the building is not red, but it is a reason for thinking that the building’s appearance
does not give good grounds for thinking that the building is red. While there are
different ways of fleshing out the notion of an undercutting defeater, for our purposes
we can define an undercutting defeater for n as a prima facie reason for thinking that
the considerations that support n do not reliably indicate its truth in the agent’s
present circumstances.16
If we follow Pollock in assuming that these are the only two species of defeat,17
we can venture the following disjunctive definition of when one inference branch
defeats another (cf. Pollock 1992):
Branch Defeat An inference branch ψ defeats an inference branch χ iff a node of
ψ defeats a node of χ, where a node n defeats a node n′ iff n either rebuts or
undercuts n′,
—i.e., either n is a prima facie reason to believe ¬n′, or n is a prima facie reason to
believe that the immediate ancestors of n′ do not reliable indicate the truth of
n′ in the agent’s present circumstances.
This gives us a definition of when one inference branch defeats another. But what
we really want is a definition of when an inference branch is ultimately undefeated.
The simplest option would be to say that an inference branch is ultimately undefeated
just in case there is no inference branch that defeats it. But this delivers the wrong
results in cases of defeater defeat.
Recall Two Testimony Seeing Red, in which Anne testifies that Sal is a compul-
sive liar. As in Seeing Red, Sal’s testimony supports the node, The wall is illuminated
by red lights (rl), which supports the node, Lori’s visual experience doesn’t reliably
indicate the truth of red, which undercuts red. Hence the simple account predicts
that branch α is ultimately defeated, and hence that Lori’s belief in red is unjustified.
But this is wrong. After all, Anne’s testimony provides a prima facie reason to believe
that Sal is a liar, which provides a prima facie reason to believe that Sal’s testimony
does not reliably indicate rl, which undercuts rl. As noted in §3.1, it thereby
reinstates Lori’s justification for believing red. (See Fig. 2.)
For this reason, Pollock opts for a somewhat more complicated account of what
it takes for an inference branch to be ultimately undefeated. Here we will follow the
treatment in Pollock (1987), who introduces a technical notion of being in at a level,
defined recursively as follows:
16The ‘in the present circumstances’ qualification is important. After all, Sal’s testimony does not
provide a reason for doubting that reddish wall appearances usually indicate the presence of a red
wall.
17This is a controversial assumption; some have suggested that cases of higher order evidence
constitute a distinct species of defeat (e.g., Christensen 2010). My own inclination is to think that when
higher order evidence functions as a genuine defeater, it does so by indicating that the agent’s actual
(or believed) grounds for their belief do not reliably indicate the truth of this belief. If this is right, then
defeat by higher order evidence is really just a type of undercutting defeat. But this is a debate that
will need to be deferred to another occasion.
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veLori’svisual experience
α
rl
wall illuminated
by red lights
stSal’s testimony
β
u ve doesn’treliably indicate rrwall is red
u′
st doesn’t
reliably indicate rl
clSal is acompulsive liar
atAnne’s testimony
γ
Figure 2: Two Testimony Seeing Red
In At A Level
1. All inference branches are in at level 0.
2. An inference branch ψ is in at a level n + 1 iff ψ is not defeated by any
inference branch that is in at level n; otherwise, ψ is out at level n + 1.
Next, we use the notion of being in at a level to characterize what it is for an
inference branch to be ultimately undefeated, as follows:
Undefeated Inference Branch An inference branch ψ is ultimately undefeated iff
there is an m such that for every n ≥ m, ψ is in at level n.
Level α β γ
0 in in in
1 out out in
2 in out in
n > 2 in out in
Table 1: Computing defeat.
To get a feel for this proposal, let’s walk through
how it applies to Two Testimony Seeing Red. While
all three inference branches depicted in Fig. 2 are in at
level 0, only γ is in at every level, since only it lacks a
defeater. Since γ defeats β, the latter is out at every level≥ 1. And so while α is out at level 1 (since it is defeated
by a branch that is in at level 0), it is back in at level 2,
and and remains in at every level thereafter. (See Table
1.) So α is ultimately undefeated. Hence Lori’s belief in
red qualifies as ultima facie justified, as desired.
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5 Reason to want more
Pollock’s framework thus offers a promising way of handling some of the cases that
created trouble for ARP—in particular, cases of defeater defeat. Why not just jettison
reliabilism in favor of the Reasons First program?
There are a number of reasons why one might be dissatisfied with Pollock’s
theory as it stands. Some of these are issues of detail which Pollock himself sought to
address in later work. For example, Pollock later refines his characterization of what
it takes for an inference branch to be ultimately undefeated—refinements that are
mainly motivated by self-defeating inferences. He also complicates the account by
adding additional structure in order to represent the strengths of reasons for belief.18
Other concerns focus on specific applications of Pollock’s framework to various
philosophical puzzles, such as the lottery paradox.19 I will set these worries aside,
since they are not directly relevant to our purposes. Rather, I want to raise two more
fundamental concerns.
One concern is that Pollock’s account does not accommodate the intuitions and
impulses that motivate reliabilism. First, it does not capture the intuition that there
is an important connection between justification and truth. Suppose a belief is
based on undefeated reasons that support it. Why should we expect the belief to
be connected with the truth in any interesting way? Pollock’s framework provides
no answer. Second, and more critically, Pollock’s framework does not satisfy the
reductive impulse behind reliabilism. Pollock explains ultima facie justification and
defeat in terms of the notion of a prima facie reason for believing. But this is surely
an epistemic notion. Those who want an analysis of justification in non-epistemic
terms will be left empty-handed.
Of course, some Reasons Firsters might retort that we should never have hoped
for a reductive analysis in the first place. Reductive analyses of other epistemic
phenomena have a spotty track record, the analysis of knowledge being a case in
point. Why think that the prospects for a reductive analysis of justification will be
any better?
But this brings me to my second concern, which that even if we renounce our
reductive hopes, it is natural to expect some account—reductive or not—of prima
facie reasons. After all, without some account, the Reasons First framework will not
offer a predictive theory at all. Unless we have some independent grip on prima facie
reasons for belief, we will not be able to apply Pollock’s framework to particular
cases in order to make predictions about whether a belief is justified or defeated.
Pollock was sensitive to this concern, and in various places he offers remarks
intended to fill this lacuna. For example, he states that perceptual appearances
provide prima facie reasons to believe; so does memory; so does statistical syllogism;
so does deduction and induction (Pollock 1987: 486-490). These remarks go some
18See Pollock (1994, 1995) for his refined treatment of self-defeating inference branches. See Pollock
(2001) for discussion of strengths of reasons.
19See Lasonen-Aarnio (2010b).
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distance towards giving us a grip on the notion of prima facie reasons.
However, I think there are still grounds for dissatisfaction. As it stands, Pollock’s
remarks look more like a list of various sources of prima facie reasons than a genuine
theory thereof. A genuine theory should be explanatorily satisfying: it should
tell us what perception, memory, and induction have in common, in virtue of
which they furnish prima facie reasons for belief, whereas, say, wishful thinking and
counterinduction do not. By comparison, reliabilism offers a much more unified and
theoretically satisfying account of the ultimate grounds of justification. According
to reliabilism, all the ultimate sources of justification have one property in common:
their reliability.20 For these reasons, we should not simply replace reliabilism with
Pollock’s framework. Instead, we should seek a synthesis that preserves the virtues
of both approaches. It is to this task which I now turn.
6 Reasons reliabilism
6.1 A reliabilist account of reasons
The basic idea behind my proposal is simple. Reliabilists should identify reasons for
belief with the inputs to reliable or conditionally reliable belief-forming processes.
A more careful statement proceeds recursively. The base clause gives an account
of an agent’s foundational reasons:
Reliable Reasons (Base Clause) If s is a non-doxastic state of an agent A, and there
is a reliable process available to A which, when given s as input, is disposed to
produce a belief in p, then s is a prima facie reason for A to believe p.
What sort of states play this role? The clearest candidates are perceptual ex-
periences. For example, Lori’s visual experience of a red-looking wall is a prima
facie reason to believe red. Why? Because she has a reliable process that takes
the contents of her perceptual experiences as input and produces a belief in those
contents as output. And this process is disposed to produce a belief in red, when
applied to her visual experience of red-looking wall.21
Do states other than perceptual experiences also fit the bill? Perhaps—depending
on one’s views, rational intuitions and seemings may also serve this foundational
role. Perhaps even non-experiential states could play the part. For our purposes,
there is no need to take a stand on this issue.
Next, we add a recursive clause, which gives an account of an agent’s derivative
reasons:
20Cf. Goldman’s criticism of disjunctive accounts of justification (1979: 90).
21Here the details will depend on how we individuate perceptual processes. Is veridical perception
a different process from non-veridical perception? If yes, then Reliable Reasons predicts that whether
Lori’s experience provides a genuine reason for believing red depends on whether she is hallucinating.
For our purposes, we can refrain from taking a stand on this issue; I intend my reliabilist account of
reasons to be compatible with various positions on how to individuate processes, perceptual processes
included.
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Reliable Reasons (Recursive Clause) If A has a prima facie reason to believe p, and
there is some conditionally reliable process available to A which, given a belief
in p as input, is disposed to produce a belief in q, then p is a prima facie reason
for A to believe q.
To illustrate, suppose Lori is capable of inferring At least one thing in my vicinity is
red from red. Since this inferential process is conditionally reliable, the recursive
clause tells us that red provides a prima facie reason for Lori to hold this inferential
belief.
Round everything out with the customary closure clause (nothing else is a
prima facie reason for A to believe p), and you have a complete reliabilist theory
of reasons. Of course, this theory could—and perhaps should—be complicated in
various ways. For example, in §5 I mentioned that Pollock’s final inference graphs
include representations of the strengths of an agent’s reasons. A natural way of
modeling this in a reliabilist framework is to take the strength of an agent’s reasons
to correspond to the degrees of reliability (and conditional reliability) of the relevant
processes. Thus if there is an extremely reliable process that is disposed to produce
a belief in p, given state s1 as input, but there is only a somewhat reliable process
that is disposed to produce a belief in p, given state s2 as input, then s1 is a stronger
reason to believe p than s2.
Some might worry that Reliable Reasons fails to do justice to our ordinary
conception of reasons. After all, many proponents of a Reasons First approach
embrace internalism about reasons. They are thus inclined to say that an agent’s
reasons supervene on their non-factive mental states, and that agents have privileged
access to their reasons for belief. From this internalist perspective, the account offered
here risks mangling the concept of reasons beyond recognition.
But is the ordinary conception of reasons really internalist? Compare the dialectic
here with debates over the nature of justification. Prior to 70s, most epistemologists
embraced some form of internalism about justification. But from this the fact alone it
does not follow that the folk notion of justification is internalist, as reliabilists will
take pains to insist. Similar remarks apply to reasons. It is questionable whether the
folk concept of reasons is committed—even implicitly—to technical claims about the
supervenience of reasons on our non-factive mental states.
A more plausible view is that the folk concept of reasons is exhausted by various
platitudes connecting reasons with other epistemic notions—e.g., ‘A justified belief
is supported by reasons’ (§4). Such platitudes are consistent with both internalist
and externalist construals of the relevant notions, as well will now see.
6.2 From reasons to justification
Equipped with Reliable Reasons, reliabilists can embrace Pollock’s framework. In
particular, they can accept Justified Belief as Undefeated Reasoning: for a belief to be
ultima facie justified is for it to be the result of an ultimately undefeated inference
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branch. But what this means is now given a reliabilist interpretation. Let’s take this
step by step.
Recall that in order for a belief B to be the result of an inference branch ψ, B must
be supported by the reasoning in ψ, and must be held as a causal consequence of this
reasoning. On the reliabilist interpretation advocated here, an inference branch is
just a chain of reliable or conditionally reliable processes. If B is a foundational belief,
then this chain consists of a single reliable process applied to some non-doxastic
state. If B is an inferential belief, then the first link in this chain is a conditionally
reliable process applied to some further belief B′, which is itself the result of a chain
of reliable or conditionally reliable processes.
Next, what does it mean for an inference branch to be ultimately undefeated, on
a reliabilist picture? Here too, reliabilists can accept Pollock’s account. Following
Pollock, reliabilists can explain this in terms of the notion of being in at a level, which
is in turn characterized in terms of when one inference branch defeats another. And
they can go on to analyze what it is for one inference branch to defeat another in
terms of prima facie reasons. But what it takes for there to be such a reason is now
explained in reliabilist terms.
Call the resulting combination of Reliable Reasons and Pollock’s framework, ‘Rea-
sons Reliabilism.’ I now argue that this synthesis preserves the primary advantages
of both frameworks.22
7 Problems solved
7.1 A more satisfactory reasons-based framework
In §5, I raised some grounds for dissatisfaction with a ‘pure’ version of Pollock’s
Reasons First framework. The first concern was that a pure Reasons First framework
fails to accommodate the intuitions and commitments that lend plausibility to
reliabilism. The synthesis advocated here fares better in this respect. First, it captures
the intuition that there is an important connection between justification and truth.
On the approach defended here, for an agent to have a reason to believe p is for them
22My proposed synthesis bears comparison to the theory advanced in Graham and Lyons (forth-
coming)—a proposal which was developed independently of the theory offered here. Graham and
Lyons suggest a theory of defeat built around the notion of prima facie warrants, which they define in
terms of available cognitive processes which would likely produce certain outputs if they were used.
In many respects, their approach is complementary to the account offered here. However, there are
some important differences. First, their theory is structured around the notion of warrants rather than
reasons—indeed, Graham and Lyons reject the need to appeal to reasons in a theory of justification. By
contrast, it is one of the contentions of the present essay that once we naturalize reasons, they pose
no threat to the reliabilist. Second, their account is not explicitly reliabilist: they define prima facie
warrants in terms of available processes that satisfy the requirements of prima facie justification, without
taking a stand on how best to cash out the latter requirements. Third, Graham and Lyons’ analysis of
warrants takes a counterfactual form. This raises the worry that it will be subject to versions of the
counterfactual fallacy-style worries that beset ARP (e.g., the sort of worries raised in §3.3). By contrast,
I’ll be arguing shortly that Reasons Reliabilism avoids these concerns.
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to have a reliable—hence truth-conducive—process that is disposed to produce a
belief in p. Second, our synthesis remains faithful to reliabilism’s reductive ambitions.
Rather than resting content with a non-reductive analysis of justification in terms
of the notion of a reason to believe, Reliable Reasons shows how this notion can
cashed out in non-epistemic notions. It thus fulfills the reliabilist goal of providing a
naturalistic account of justification.
The second concern for a pure Reasons First framework was that it lacks an
explanatorily satisfying account of what all reasons have in common. Why is it that
perception, memory, induction, and so on all provide reasons to believe? Reliable
Reasons answers this question. What all reasons have in common is that they serve
as the inputs to reliable (or conditionally reliable) processes.
The upshot: Reasons Reliabilism avoids the main concerns with a pure Reasons
First approach.
7.2 A more satisfactory treatment of defeat
I’ll now argue that my proposed synthesis also preserves the main advantage of
Pollock’s framework—specifically, its superior treatment of defeat. To make this
point, let us revisit the difficulties facing ARP and see how Reasons Reliabilism
avoids them.
7.2.1 Defeater defeat
The first difficulty for ARP was that it has trouble with defeater defeat. As we
have seen, Pollock’s definition of an undefeated inference branch is tailor-made to
handle such cases. Since Reasons Reliabilism makes use of Pollock’s definition of an
undefeated inference branch, it can enjoy the fruits of Pollock’s labors.
To illustrate, recall Two Testimony Seeing Red. Reasons Reliabilists can accept
the inference graph we sketched for this case (Fig. 2). And they can say all the things
that we said earlier about this inference graph. In particular, they can say that the
inference branch responsible for Lori’s belief in red is ultimately undefeated, since
the only inference branch that defeats it is out at every level ≥ 1.
However, Reasons Reliabilists do not stop there. They supplement this formal
representation of Lori’s reasons with a reliabilist account of where the nodes come
from, and why the various support and defeat links hold. According to Reliable
Reasons, the reason why the experience of receiving Anne’s testimony is a prima
facie reason to believe that Sal is a compulsive liar is that there is a reliable process
(believing reliable interlocutors) available to Lori that, when fed this experience as input,
is disposed to produce a belief that Sal is a compulsive liar. Similar remarks apply,
mutatis mutandis, to the other nodes depicted in the graph.
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7.2.2 Circularity worries
The second difficulty was that ARP turns out to be circular. To recap: the worry
was that the proper way of unpacking ARP will rely on the notion of ultima facie
justification. But ARP is used to articulate the conditions under which a belief is
undefeated—a concept that occurs in the base clause of Recursive Reliabilism.
Reasons Reliabilism avoids this worry. Following Reasons Firsters, we define
ultima facie justification in terms of the notion of a prima facie reason for believing.
And we then recursively define this notion in terms of the inputs to various belief-
forming processes. Crucially, the base clause of this definition (Reliable Reasons)
does not itself rely on the notion of defeat, or any other epistemic notion for that
matter.23
7.2.3 Alternative processes that one should not use
The final difficulty for ARP came from cases where an agent has an alternative
reliable process that they have no good reason to use. In Thinking About Unger,
ARP predicts that Harry’s belief in tree is defeated merely in virtue of the fact that
he has an available reliable process (his Unger Predictor) which, were he to use it,
would lead him to suspend judgment on whether there’s a tree in front of him.
The theory advocated here avoids this prediction. To see this, recall that if Harry’s
Unger Predictor were fed Harry’s current states as input, it would produce as output
a belief in suspend: Unger would advise me to suspend judgment on tree. As we saw
in §3.3, this belief could itself be viewed as the input to a further process, which leads
Harry to suspend judgment regarding tree. But neither process would produce
either a belief in ¬tree or a belief that Harry’s current states do not reliably indicate
the truth of tree. And so, according to Reliable Reasons, Harry doesn’t have either
a rebutting or an undercutting defeater for his belief in tree.
Perhaps, some may suggest, the problem re-emerges if we amend the case. Meet
Elijah the eliminativist. Elijah thinks trees do not exist, and he wants others to share
this belief. Suppose that Harry has a highly reliable Elijah Predictor, which is part of
an Elijah Emulator: if he were to predict that Elijah would advise him to believe p
in his current situation, this would in turn lead him to believe p. And so if Harry
were to apply his current experiential states to his Elijah Predictor, he would be led
23At the same time, Reasons Reliabilism respects Fumerton’s claim that a conditionally reliable
process can only serve as a defeater if it is applied to ultima facie justified inputs. Proof: Suppose A’s
inference graph contains some node n, and suppose that A unjustifiably believes some proposition
q that, when fed into a conditionally reliable process, is disposed to produce a belief in d, where d
is either of the form, ¬n or n’s immediate ancestors do not reliably indicate n. Since A’s belief that q is
unjustified, it follows (from Justified Belief as Undefeated Reasoning) that either (i) A’s belief in q is
not the result of any inference branch, or (ii) it is the result of some inference branch, but one of the
branch’s nodes is ultimately defeated. If (i), then A doesn’t even have a prima facie reason to believe
q, and so (by Reliable Reasons) q is not a prima facie reason to believe d. If (ii), then q is a prima facie
reason to believe d, but q is ultimately defeated. Either way, n is not ultimately defeated.
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to believe ¬tree. Does Reasons Reliabilism predict that this gives Harry a rebutting
defeater for his belief in tree?
An initial point: given this way of describing the case, it is doubtful whether
Harry’s Elijah Emulator is reliable. After all, it systematically misleads him about the
presence of trees, which hardly bodes well for its reliability! However, the objector
might try to circumvent this point by tempering Elijah’s eliminativism. Just stipulate
that, much like Shmunger before him, Elijah has has entirely correct beliefs about all
sorts of topics—astronomy, geography, physics, whatever. It is only when it comes to
trees that Elijah is an eliminativist. And so Harry’s Elijah Emulator is overall reliable,
even though it is unreliable on arboreal matters.
Suppose we grant all of this. Then Reasons Reliabilism does indeed predict that
Harry has a rebutting defeater for his belief in tree. However, this need not worry
us, provided that this defeater is itself defeated. Consider: why, exactly, would Harry
be unjustified in using his Elijah Emulator in his current situation? Presumably,
because he has good reason to think that his visual experience of trees reliably
correlates with the presence of trees. Where does this reason come from? Presumably
from his past experiences, which support the generalization that having a visual
experience representing x is a reliable indicator of the presence of x. Plausibly, there
is a reliable process available to him that, given these past experiences as input, is
disposed to produce a belief that his current tree-like experiences reliably indicate
tree rather than ¬tree. If so, these past experiences constitute an undercutting
defeater for his rebutting defeater for believing tree. (See Fig. 3.) And so his belief
in tree counts as ultima facie justified, as desired.
veHarry’svisual experience ea
Elijah would
advise believing ¬t
¬ttTree infront of Harry
pe past experiences
u ea doesn’treliably indicate ¬t
Figure 3: Thinking about Eliminativism
Could proponents of ARP co-opt this response? No. After all, the key move here
is to diagnose this variant scenario as a case of defeater defeat. But we’ve seen that
ARP lacks an adequate treatment of defeater defeat.
7.3 Capturing the role of reasons in justification
The primary payoff of recasting reliabilism in terms of reasons is that it provides a
satisfactory treatment of defeat. However, a further benefit is also worth noting.
Historically, reliabilism has had little to say about reasons for belief. While it
has not denied their existence, it has maintained a conspicuous silence about their
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nature.24 But clearly there are such reasons, and any complete epistemology should
have something to say about them.
Reasons Reliabilism offers a natural way of bringing reasons into the reliabilist
fold. And it does so in a way that underwites the intuitive connections between
reasons and justification.
8 Comparison with evidentialist hybrids
8.1 The two component view
I’ve advocated integrating reliabilism with a reasons-based framework—a framework
that has traditionally been viewed as a rival to reliabilism. In doing so, I may appear
to be joining my voice to a rising chorus. In recent years a wave of authors have
suggested integrating reliabilism with evidentialism—a view that has also been
viewed as a competitor to reliabilism.25 How, then, does my synthesis differ from
more familiar evidentialist-reliabilist hybrids?
To answer this, it will be helpful to look in some detail at how evidentialist-
reliabilists handle defeat. On a standard evidentialist view, justification and defeat
are explained in terms of evidential support. A belief is prima facie justified when it
is supported by some initial body of evidence e1. Defeat occurs when the agent
acquires further evidence e2 which, when combined with e1, no longer supports the
belief.
There are various ways one could integrate this general approach with reliabil-
ism. A particularly straightforward strategy is suggested by Goldman (2011), who
proposes that ultima facie justification involves two components: a reliable process
condition and an evidential support condition. That is:
Two Component View A’s belief that p is ultima facie justified iff both:
Reliable Process Condition A’s belief that p is the result of a reliable belief-
forming process,
Evidential Support Condition A’s total evidence supports believing p.26,27
It is easy to see in broad brushstrokes how the Evidential Support Condition
helps with defeat. Take Seeing Red. When Lori first has the visual experience of a
24This is at least true of process reliabilists in the tradition of Goldman (1979, 1986). The work of
Tyler Burge offers a very different sort of reliabilist approach in which reasons play an important role.
See e.g., the papers collected in Burge (2013).
25See the references in fn. 5.
26The Two Component View could be complicated in a number of ways. For example, we might
hold that the two conditions are not entirely independent. Rather, we might follow Comesaña (2010) in
holding that the reliable process needs to take evidence as input. (According to Comesaña, this helps
with both the generality problem and Bonjour’s case of Norman the clairvoyant.) For my purposes, I
will set such complications aside.
27Hybrid views that impose some version of an Evidential Support Condition include Tang (2016);
Comesaña (2018); and Miller (2019).
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red-appearing wall, her total evidence supports believing red, hence her belief is
ultima facie justified. But once she receives Sal’s testimony, her total body of evidence
expands. This more inclusive body of evidence no longer supports believing red.
As Miller (2019) notes, a view along these lines also avoids many of the problems
facing ARP. Take defeater defeat: when Lori acquires Anne’s testimony in Two
Testimony Seeing Red, her total body of evidence changes once again, and red
regains its former level of support. Or take Thinking About Unger: arguably,
Harry’s total evidence supports believing red, despite the availability of his Unger
Predictor.
Given these virtues, is there any reason to prefer Reasons Reliabilism to the Two
Component View? While a full adjudication of this issue is beyond the scope of this
paper, I want to briefly raise two reasons for thinking that the answer is ‘yes.’
8.2 First advantage: reductive and predictive
As it stands, the Two Component View is not reductive. After all, the Evidential
Support Condition packages together two epistemic notions:
(i) The notion of an agent’s total evidence,28
(ii) the notion of a body of evidence supporting a belief.
Perhaps, some might suggest, this just shows that we need to supplement the Two
Component View with a reductive analysis of these notions. To do so, proponents
of the Two Component View could try taking a page from the Reasons Reliabilists.
According to Reliable Reasons, prima facie reasons are the inputs to reliable and
conditionally reliable processes. Why not say the same about evidence? An agent’s
total evidence, on this view, is the total set of states of the agent that can serve as
potential inputs to the reliable processes available to the agent.
This would give us a reductive analysis of (i). What about (ii)? According to one
common approach, evidential support should be understood in probabilistic terms:
a body of evidence e supports believing p just in case the probability of p given e is
sufficiently high. Putting these two suggestions together, we get:
Evidential Support Condition (Unpacked) A’s total evidence supports believing p
iff Pr(p ∣ A is in states s1 . . . sn) > t, where
• s1 . . . sn are all the states of A that can potentially serve as inputs to A’s
reliable belief-forming processes,
• t is some threshold.
28Note that the challenge here is not just to give an account of evidence in non-epistemic terms. It’s
to give an account of what it is for an agent to possess evidence in non-epistemic terms. See Beddor
(2015b, 2016: chp.1) for discussion of some difficulties on this front.
21
reasons for reliabilism
What sort of probability is at issue here? One option would be to define Pr in
epistemic terms: for example, we could say that Pr reflects the credences that are
justified by the evidence. But clearly this is to give up any reductive ambitions.29
Perhaps, then, we should follow Tang (2016) in taking Pr to reflect objective
probabilities. This would result in a reductive theory, but it gives rise to a further
concern: Is the theory predictive? And do the predictions vindicate our pretheoretic
judgments about defeat?
To flesh out this concern, go back to Seeing Red. On the view under considera-
tion, to determine whether Lori’s belief is defeated by Sal’s testimony, we check the
objective probability of red conditional on Lori’s total post-Sal-testimony evidence.
But how do we check this? Perhaps via intuition, but it is questionable whether we
have clear-cut intuitions about such probabilities. And things only get worse when
consider defeater defeat. In Two Testimony Seeing Red, how do we determine
the objective probability of red conditional on Lori’s post-Sal+Anne-testimony evi-
dence? The worry, then, is that while this version of the Two Component View may
be consistent with our intuitions about defeat, it does not yet predict these intuitions.
While this is hardly the final word on the matter, these considerations highlight
the hurdles that arise when we try to develop the Two Component View in a way
that is both fully reductive and predictive.
8.3 Second advantage: no immunity to defeat
The second advantage of Reasons Reliabilism over the Two Component View stems
from a structural difference between the two frameworks. One hallmark of Pollock’s
framework is that nothing is exempt from defeat. For any proposition p, it’s easy to
concoct a defeater for p—just imagine a reliable source tells you either ¬p or that
your reasons do not support p. By contrast, the Evidential Support Condition singles
out a class of propositions that get a free pass from defeat. Let me explain.
It’s a familiar observation that whenever some part of an agent’s evidence entails
p, their total evidence also entails p, hence the probability of p conditional on their
total evidence is 1. So probabilistic approaches to defeat predict that one cannot have
a defeater for something entailed by any part of one’s current evidence:
Limited Indefeasibility If some subset of A’s evidence entails p at t, then A’s total
evidence supports p at t.
At least two sorts of cases suggest that Limited Indefeasibility runs contrary
to intuition. First, consider cases where an agent has a defeater for a belief in a
necessary truth:
Logical Luck Tom comes up with a sound proof of a particular logical theorem L.
Sometime later, he is told by his highly accomplished logic professor that his
29See Comesaña (2018), who embraces this consequence.
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proof contains a mistake. Tom nonetheless disregards her testimony, continuing
to believe L on the basis of his proof.
Intuitively, the professor’s testimony provides an undercutting defeater for Tom’s
belief in L. But any view that validates Limited Indefeasibility cannot account for
this intuition: since L is a necessary truth, Tom’s total evidence trivially entails L.
Some might regard necessary truths as a special case, to be dealt with via
independent means.30 Still, a second class of counterexamples remains: cases where
one has a defeater for some proposition that is itself part of one’s evidence. According
to the view of evidence under consideration, one’s evidence consists in various states
that serve as inputs to reliable processes. But why think that these states enjoy some
special exemption from defeat? Consider:
Emotional Introspection Kilian is happy for his brother, who recently received a
promotion. By introspection, Kilian comes to justifiably believe, I am happy
for my brother (happy). Later that day, he has a therapy session with an
extremely well-credentialed psychiatrist, who tells him that he is mistaken:
Kilian is actually jealous of his brother; he is simply unwilling to acknowledge
this. While the psychiatrist mounts a compelling argument, Kilian ignores her,
continuing to believe happy.
Kilian’s total evidence includes his happiness for his brother, since this state
serves as the input to a reliable process (introspection). And this experience entails
happy.31 Limited Indefeasibility thus predicts that his justification for this belief
is undefeated. But this seems wrong. Even though the psychiatrist is mistaken, her
testimony still provides a rebutting defeater for his belief.32
Reasons Reliabilism fares better here, since it is not committed to Limited Inde-
feasibility. Even if p is entailed by one of your reasons, you could still have a reliable
30For example, some might propose taking a page from Stalnaker’s (1999) strategy for handling the
problem of logical omniscience. According to this proposal, our intuitions about Logical Luck are not
really tracking Tom’s justification for believing L, but rather Tom’s justification for believing some
contingent proposition associated with L—for example, the proposition: SL is true, where SL is some
sentence that expresses L. However, even if this strategy can be made to work, it is a mark in favor of
Reasons Reliabilism that it has no need of such maneuvers.
31It entails it both in the sense that its content (trivially) entails happy, and in the sense that
the fact that Killian has this experience entails happy. So regardless of whether we understand
evidential support in terms of probabilities conditional on the contents of an agent’s states or in
terms of probabilities conditional on the fact that the agent is in these states, the counterexample goes
through.
32Faced with this counterexample, one option would be to try to complicate the Evidential Support
Condition. Perhaps in order for A’s belief that p to satisfy the Evidential Support Condition, we should
also require that every sufficiently similar body of evidence would also support believing p. (Cf. Miller
(2019), who suggests quantifying over ‘partial psychological duplicates’ to handle this sort of case.)
According to this diagnosis, Killian could have been in an internally indistinguishable mental state
that only included the appearance of happiness. Had he been in this state, his total evidence arguably
would not have supported happy. However, going this route raises a difficult question: can we give a
principled and reductive characterization of when a body of evidence is “sufficiently similar”?
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process that is disposed to deliver either a belief that ¬p, or a belief that your basis
for believing p does not reliably indicate its truth. In Logical Luck there is a reliable
process available to Tom (trusting the testimony of experts) that, when applied to the
experience of receiving his professor’s testimony, is disposed to produce a belief
that his proof is not a reliable guide to the truth about L. Similarly, in Emotional
Introspection the same reliable process is available to Kilian. When applied to
the experience of receiving his psychiatrist’s testimony, this process is disposed to
produce a belief in ¬happy. For the Reasons Reliabilist, no belief is immune to
defeat.
8.4 Taking Stock
Reasons Reliabilism has certain affinities with extant hybrids of evidentialism and
reliabilism: both are attempts to meld reliabilism with theoretical frameworks that
are usually associated with internalism. However, there are important theoretical
differences between the two approaches. I’ve given some reason to think that
these differences speak in favor of Reasons Reliabilism. First, Reasons Reliabilism
is both reductive and and predictive, whereas it proves difficult to develop the
Two Component View in a way that enjoys both these virtues. Second, the Two
Component View—and probabilistic approaches to defeat more generally—grant a
certain class of propositions a principled exemption from defeat. Reasons Reliabilism
bestows no such favors.
Of course, given the affinities between the two approaches, some may be inclined
to classify Reasons Reliabilism as a type of hybrid view. Should they do so, I would
raise no objection. The important point is that if it is a hybrid view, it is the most
promising one to date, at least when it comes to handling defeat.33
9 Conclusion
For most of their history, the reliabilist tradition and the Reasons First tradition
have been developed in isolation from each other. In this paper, I’ve argued that
an integration of the two approaches proves mutually beneficial. The synthesis
developed here avoids reliabilism’s difficulties with defeat, while still preserving the
explanatory advantages that make reliabilism attractive.
While I have focused on justification, my conclusions also have implications
for the study of knowledge. Recently, some authors sympathetic to externalism
33Another view that bears some resemblance to Reasons Reliabilism is the Reasons First virtue
epistemology developed in Sylvan and Sosa (2018). According to Sylvan and Sosa, facts about what an
agent is justified in believing are determined by facts about what she has sufficient epistemic reason to
believe, which are in turn determined by facts about her competent attractions to assent to various
propositions. While there are a number of similiarities between the two approaches, there is also
a crucial difference. Sylvan and Sosa do not offer their reasons first brand of virtue epistemology
as a reductive approach. Rather, they take the notion of a ‘competent attraction to assent’ to be a
normatively loaded notion—a notion that cannot be reduced to talk of reliable processes.
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have argued for the surprising conclusion that knowledge is indefeasible.34 One
argument for this bold conclusion is that we have no satisfactory externalist story
about how knowledge defeat works.35 The view developed in this paper shows one
way developing such a story. As long as justification is a necessary condition on
knowledge, we can use this account of justification to explain how knowledge is
likewise subject to a defeat condition.36
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